奧利弗·哈特（Oliver Simon D'Arcy Hart）哈佛大學Andrew E. Furer經濟學教授，經濟計量學會、美國人文與科學院院士，英國科學院院士，不完全合約理論的開創者之一。他至今仍是該領域的領軍人物之一。
Harvard economist and Barcelona GSE Scientific Council member Oliver Hart visited the Ciutadella campus of the School on May 22 to speak on "Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points".
The lecture was part of the Microeconomics and Finance seminar series organized by the UPF Department of Economics and Business, one of the Barcelona GSE's founding academic institutions. On May 21st the seminar series also hosted Johns Hopkins University and University of Oxford
Professor Peyton Young, who spoke about "Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations".
As a member of the Barcelona GSE's Scientific Council, Professor Hart joins a team of 30 leading academics who collaborate to ensure that the School offers the highest caliber of teaching and research. The Scientific Council is chaired by Professor Hugo Sonnenschein, former President of the University of Chicago, and includes ten Nobel Economics Laureates.
Professor Hart received a Ph.D. in economics from Princeton University (1974), an MSc in economics from Warwick University (1972) and a BA in mathematics from Cambridge University (1969). He has been the first Andrew Furer Professor of Economics at Harvard since 1997, where he served as Chair of the Economics Department from 2000-2003. He has also been Centennial Visiting Professor at London School of Economics
since 1997. Previously, he has held academic positions at MIT, Wharton, Cambridge, and Essex University.
In addition to his academic accolades, Professor Hart boasts a long list of professional accomplishments. He is current President of the American Law and Economics Association and Senior Academic Advisor to the Shanghai Jiao Tong University. He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and has been granted honorary doctorates from the Free University of Brussels
and the University of Basel. He has delivered major lectures at universities and conferences around the world, including the 1988 Fisher-Schultze Lecture of the Econometric Society.
Professor Hart has served on the Executive Committee and on the Council of the Econometric Society, the American Law and Economics Association, and many others. He has been on the editorial boards of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance, Games and Economic Behavior, Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, and the Journal of Economic Theory.
His main areas of research are theory of the firm, economics theory, and law and economics. He is the author of the book Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure published by Oxford University Press, and has written numerous articles published in the leading scientific journals, as well as in The Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times.
Born in Britain, he earned his B.A. in mathematics at King's College, Cambridge in 1969, his M.A. in economics at University of Warwick in 1972, and his Ph.D. in economics at Princeton University in 1974. He then became a fellow at Churchill College, Cambridge and a professor at the London School
of Economics. In 1984, he returned to the U.S., where he taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and, since 1993, at Harvard University. He was chairman of the Harvard economics department from 2000 to 2003. He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and of the Econometric Society, and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. He has been President of the American Law and Economics Association and Vice-President of the American Economic Association, and has several honorary degrees.
He is an American citizen. He is married to writer Rita B. Goldberg and has two sons and a grandson. He is the son of Philip D'Arcy Hart.
He is an expert on contract theory, theory of the firm, corporate finance, and law and economics. His research centers on the roles that ownership structure and contractual arrangements play in the governance and boundaries of corporations.
- Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (Oxford University Press, 1995).
- Selected Articles
- "On the Optimality of Equilibrium when the Market Structure is Incomplete",Journal of Economic Theory, December 1975,418-443
- "Takeover Bids, the Free-rider problem, and the Theory of the Corporation" (with Sanford J. Grossman), Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1980,42-64
- "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem" (with Sanford J. Grossman), Econometrica (January 1983) 7-46.
- "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983) 366-82.
- "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" (with Sanford J. Grossman), Journal of Political Economy, August 1986,691-719.
- "One Share-One vote and the Market for Corporate Control" (with Sanford J. Grossman), Journal of Financial Economics, 1988
- "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation" (with John Hardman Moore), Econometrica 56(4) (July 1988).
- "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm" (with John Hardman Moore), Journal of Political Economy 98(6) (1990).
- " A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital " with John Hardman Moore, Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1994,841-879
- "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons" (with Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny), Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4) (1997) 1126-61.
- "Contracts as Reference Points" ( with John Hardman Moore), Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 2008,1-48.